Denver Law Review
Volume 63

Issue 1

Article 6

January 1985

William H. Erickson
Timothy M. Tymkovich

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Timothy M. Tymkovich, William H. Erickson, 63 Denv. U. L. Rev. 11 (1985).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WILLIAM
TIMOTHY

H.
M.

ERICKSON

TYMKOVICH*

Justice William H. Erickson joined the Colorado Supreme Court in
1971. His appointment to the court as Governor John A. Love's third
merit appointee followed a colorful and vigorous twenty years of trial
practice and service to the legal profession. Known for his ability as a
trial lawyer to extract defensible positions from sometimes indefensible
clients,Justice Erickson has demonstrated exemplary service and loyalty
to the public and his profession through his tenure as Supreme Court
Justice and his leadership in local and national bar associations.
For twenty years, Justice Erickson combined an illustrious trial practice with generous service to the legal profession. He defended some of
Colorado's most infamous criminals-Joseph Corbett, convicted of murdering Adolph Coors III, and Eugene "Checkers" Smaldone, alleged
Denver kingpin and organized crime figure; he defended a bitter takeover attempt of The Denver Post by newspaper magnate S.I. Newhouse;
he represented personal injury claimants and insurance companies
under then-nascent product liability theories; and he represented district court judges whose salaries had been wrongfully frozen by recalcitrant county administrators.
Justice Erickson's heterogenous trial practice was balanced by service to the bar. He was president of the Denver Bar Association in 196869; he represented Colorado in the American Bar Association as a member of the ABA's governing body, the House of Delegates; and he
chaired the ABA's council of the Section on CriminalJustice in 1971 and
1972. After joining the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Erickson was
elected to the Council of the American Law Institute and to the Fellows
of the American Bar Foundation, on both of which he continues to
serve.
Following his appointment to the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice
Erickson was named by President Richard M. Nixon to chair the President's National Committee for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance. I Erickson's familiarity
with "bugging" did not begin with the Wiretap Commission. In 1973.
he was one of four finalists for the position of Special Prosecutor for the
Watergate investigation. Archibald Cox was subsequently named to
2
serve in that capacity.
*
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1982); Associate,

Davis, Graham & Stubbs. The author was a law clerk to Justice Erickson in 1982-83.
1.

See UNITED STATES NATIONAl, COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAl. AND STATE

Ims.WS RELATING rO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILIANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEII.ILANCE REPORT (1976).
2. See generally J. DoYi.E, Nor ABOVE TIE I.Aw 42 (1977). The other finalists were
Federal District Court.judge Harold Tyler. Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher.
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PRIVATE PRACTICE

Professional Background

Justice Erickson, a Denver native, graduated from the Colorado
School of Mines in 1947 with a degree in petroleum engineering. His
father, A.X. Erickson, had a successful trial practice in Denver and Justice Erickson chose to follow in those paternal footsteps. Justice Erickson attended the University of Virginia School of Law, obtaining his
LL.B. in 1950. He joined his father's small Denver law office immediately upon graduation.
Intent on developing his litigation skills, the young Erickson
haunted the federal courthouses in search of pro bono appointments in
criminal matters. In 1951, federal appointments were unpaid; unsurprisingly, Erickson obtained as many cases as he could handle. Despite
his precocity, Erickson's tender age and lack of experience resulted in
many a "trial by ordeal." Nevertheless, that courtroom wisdom or sixth
sense which may be acquired only through experience was developed
early in the young litigator. Indeed, the federal judges, grateful for Erickson's willingness to take pro bono cases, were generous in critiquing
Erickson's trial work and offering advice. It did not take long for Erickson to gain a reputation for his skills as a trial lawyer.
Justice Erickson founded his own firm in 1958. Along with two tax
specialists, Hayes R. Hindry and Milton E. Meyer, Jr., Erickson created
Hindry, Erickson & Meyer. The senior Erickson became of counsel to
the firm. The firm grew to twenty-two attorneys by 1969 and included
Denver-area practitioners Kerwin H. Fulton, Charles F. Brega, C. Henry
Roath, Jay L. Gueck, and James J. Morrato.
Justice Erickson left Hindry, Erickson & Meyer in 1969 and formed
an insurance defense practice with Duane 0. Littell. That partnership
ended after a brief period. Erickson then practiced under his own name
until he was appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court in 1971.
B.

Significant Cases

Justice Erickson practiced law with and against some of the nation's
legendary trial lawyers. In addition to some of Colorado's masters,
Erickson tried cases with Louis Nizer, Arthur Goldberg, Edward Bennett
Williams, and John W. Davis. These formidable friends and foes highlight a variegated criminal and civil practice.
1.

3
Corbett v. People

On February 9, 1960, Joseph Corbett, Jr. kidnapped and murdered
Adolph Coors III. Coors, scion of the well-known Golden, Colorado
brewing family and officer in the Adolph Coors Brewing Company, disand retired Federal Judge David Peck. All four were unable to sacrilice their independence as prosecutors to the conditions set forth by Attorney General Elliot Richardson.
3. 153 Colo. 457, 387 P.2d 409 (1963), rert. demted, 377 U.S. 939 (1964).
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appeared on his way to work; a pool of blood lay next to his car nearby
his mountain home. After a nationwide manhunt, Joseph Corbett was
identified as the prime suspect and arrested in Vancouver, British Columbia on October 29, 1960.
Corbett's father sought to retain Justice Erickson for the younger
Corbett's defense. Many of Erickson's clients, however, were close
friends of the Coors family; he therefore declined to take the case. The
defense counsel subsequently retained by Corbett lacked the time and
funds to prepare an adequate defense. The trial court, on the defense
attorney's recommendation, subsequently appointed Justice Erickson to
assist in the case.
The case garnered extraordinary publicity. The news media voted
the disappearance of Coors and Corbett's subsequent arrest as the first
and second most newsworthy stories of 1960. Corbett was convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Later appeals centered on the substantial prejudice generated by the notoriety and infamy of the case, the
inappropriateness of venue in the county where the Coors brewery was
located, and the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution. Nonetheless, both the Colorado Supreme Court 4 and,
on a writ of habeas corpus, the federal district court for Colorado 5 affirmed the conviction.
2.

Caroll v. United States

6

In some cases, the trial lawyer has bad facts-in others, bad law.
When the lawyer has both, and the trial judge also doffs his robes of
impartiality to assist actively in the prosecution of the defendant, the
criminal defense lawyer and his client face insurmountable odds. Justice
Erickson faced each of these tribulations in United States v. Carroll.
Howard Carroll was a Colorado businessman who violated the federal securities law by artificially inflating the value of his company's stock
and then selling his shares in the company. Justice Erickson was retained to defend Carroll in federal district court in California. Unfortunately, the evidence of Carroll's guilt was overwhelming and the trial
appeared to be only an exercise in damage control.
The day prior to trial, one of Carroll's former business associates
told Carroll that he would offer favorable testimony in Caroll's behalf
for $5,000. Erickson advised Carroll to purchase a small tape recorder
and record the offer of perjured testimony. After the evidence was obtained, the FBI was informed and agents subsequently arrested the prospective perjurer when the money was exchanged.
Howard Carroll's cooperation was unrewarded. At trial, the federal
district judge transgressed the bounds of courtroom neutrality by his
active and overtly biased questioning of witnesses and assistance to the
4. Corbet v. People. 153 Colo. 457, 387 13.2d 409 (1963).
5. CorbcI v. Pattcrson, 272 F. Supp. 602 (1). Colo. 1967).
6. 326 F.2d 72 ((ih Cir. 1963).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

inexperienced federal prosecutor assigned to the case. The judge assisted the prosecutor in laying a foundation for the admission of key
exhibits and in cross-examining important witnesses for the government. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while upholding Carroll's conviction due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt,
7
harshly criticized the conduct of the trial judge.
II.

THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT

William H. Erickson was appointed as an Associate Justice to the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1971 by GovernorJohn A. Love. Erickson
replaced Chief Justice Robert H. McWilliams, who resigned to join the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Erickson served
as ChiefJustice during the 1983-85 terms. He is now the senior member
of the supreme court.
A.

Significant Opinions
1.

Criminal and Constitutional Law

Justice Erickson's opinions in the field of criminal law seek to strike
a balance between the rights of prosecution and the rights of the defendant. Erickson has authored opinions which enhance judicial protections for the criminal defendant, and others which expand the powers of
the police and prosecution. 8 Typically, his opinions reflect the court's
consensus on an issue and therefore gather unanimous support. Even in
years when the court split on a number of issues-the late 1970s and
early 1980s-Justice Erickson was often able to find a middle ground
agreeable to each member of the court.
Justice Erickson has advocated the adoption of a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, but has labored faithfully within the
confines of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence which, until
1984, apparently limited the use of such an exception. In People v. Deitchman,' J for example, Justice Erickson argued that the purposes of the exclusionary rule-to deter unlawful police behavior and to vindicate the
goals of the fourth amendment-are not met where police behavior is
unaffected by application of the rule. Similarly, in People v. Sporleder,"°
Erickson noted the inconsistency in using the exclusionary rule where
the court adopted a new privacy standard at variance with the standard
set forth in a directly applicable United States Supreme Court precedent. The majority in Sporleder held that the use of pen registers by police investigators to record telephone numbers dialed on private
telephones was an illegal invasion of privacy rights under the Colorado
7. SeeJ.

GOUIDEN, TiFE BENCIIWARMERS (1974).
8. Compare People v. Bothamn, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo. 1981) (reversing murder convicLion due to extensive pretrial publicity) with People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo.
1983) (dissenting on issues relating to the suppression of pen register records) and People
v. Clement, 661 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1983) (upholding police search of automobile trunk).
9. 695 l'.2d 1146 (Colo. 1985).
10. 666 1'.2d1 135 (Colo. 1983).
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Constitution unless the police first obtained a warrant supported by
probable cause. Justice Erickson dissented in Sporleder, asserting that the
use of a pen register by police investigators did not transgress legitimate
privacy interests, and, in any event, the evidence should not be suppressed based on the court's new rule. Instead, Erickson would have
applied the reasoning employed by the United States Supreme Court
when it analyzed the identical issue in Smith v. Maryland. II
Sporleder provides an insight into Justice Erickson's cautious approach to the interpretation of the Colorado Constitution in the criminal procedure area. While recognizing the plenary and independent
authority of state supreme courts to interpret state constitutions, Erickson noted the institutional risks to courts-to their legitimacy, consistency, and authority-which may accompany activist use of a state
constitution to avoid United States Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Erickson's dissent in Sporleder is balanced by his dissent in
People v. Spies. 12 In Spies, he and Justice Quinn urged the court to adopt
an automatic standing rule in cases where, without a search warrant, the
police obtain evidence from third parties or where the criminal defendant does not have a possessory interest in the property that is searched.
The majority adopted the rationale of United States v. Salvucci, 13 holding
that standing was not automatic; instead, the criminal defendant must
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched.
Justice Erickson sought sensible limits to the standing doctrine in
non-criminal cases. In Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 14 the four to
three majority opinion held, over Erickson's dissent, that non-resident
citizens (and one resident) who paid taxes in Denver had standing to
challenge the City of Denver's nativity scene erected on the steps of the
City and County Building. Erickson argued that the controversial issue
asserted by these plaintiffs, based primarily on subjective injuries, was
better left to the political process and should not be resolved by the
courts.
Justice Erickson's position as a swing vote sometimes left him alone
in the middle. In Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 15 the court
reviewed the constitutionality of Colorado's school financing system.
The court split three-one-two; Justice Erickson's concurrence provided
the fourth vote necessary to uphold the constitutionality of the legislative scheme. His concurrence, however, emphasized the slim margin by
which the financing system passed constitutional muster and the clear
need for legislative reform.
2.

Free Speech and Libel

Justice Erickson has varied most dramatically from the majority of
I1.
12.
13.
14.
15.

442
200
448
656
649

U.S. 735 (1979).
Colo. 434, 615 P.2d 710 (1980).
U.S. 83 (1980).
P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982).
P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).

DENTVER UNIVERSITY LA W REIVIE W

(Vol. 63:1

the court in the area of free speech and libel law. In Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 16 the court adopted a libel standard more solicitous to
the media than that in almost any other state. The court held that, when
publishing false and defamatory statements, but where the matter involved is of "public and general concern," the media are subject to a
"reckless disregard for the truth" standard of review. Justice Erickson,
in a lone dissent, urged instead that the proper standard should be
"simple negligence." Erickson stated that the problematic opportunity
for a libel plaintiff "to vindicate and protect his sullied reputation" mandated a standard that strikes a "reasonable balance between the right of
the news media under the First Amendment and the right of the private
citizen" under tort law. In Justice Erickson's view, a negligence standard provided that balance.
A number of other state courts, in analyzing the Walker libel issues
for the first time, have adopted Justice Erickson's reasoning. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the standard promulgated by the
Walker majority as "not achieving a balance or accommodation" with the
conflicting values of news media rights and privacy rights. 17 The
Oklahoma Court instead adopted the negligence standard suggested by
Justice Erickson. The Hawaii Supreme Court likewise criticized the
Walker majority for basing its decision on unverified speculation about
the need to insulate the media from its own excesses by a reckless disre8
gard standard.'
Justice Erickson also dissented in Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 19° on the grounds that he expressed in Walker. Erickson
reiterated his view that private citizens are effectively precluded from
libel relief by Walker and that Colorado's standard of review encouraged
"irresponsible, inaccurate and unreliable journalism."
Surprisingly, in a 1983 decision in the libel area, Burns v. McGrawHill BroadcastingCo., Inc. ,20Justice Erickson authored a four to three majority opinion that explored novel issues involving fact and opinion and
their different shades of meaning in modern reporting. The court held
that "opinions which imply the existence of an undisclosed defamatory
factual predicate may support a cause of action in defamation" if "a listener cannot evaluate the alleged defamatory language because no basis
for the statement has been disclosed."
3.

Water Law

The Colorado Supreme Court has few peers in the area of prior
appropriation law. A major contribution by the court to the resolution
of federal-state water management problems in United States v. City and
16. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).
17. Martin v. Griffin Television Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976).
18. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park, 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975).
19. 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982).
ZA?.
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County of Denver.2 1 This case was the culmination of fifteen years of litigation in state and federal courts involving the rights of private appropriators, the State of Colorado, and the federal government to allocate
Colorado's water. The court, through Justice Erickson, unanimously
upheld the applicability of the prior appropriation doctrine to federal
lands and acknowledged the traditional relationship between Colorado
law and federal reserved water rights.
4.

Torts

Justice Erickson has authored a number of opinions which explore
the increasingly ambiguous law of torts. Traditional common law policymaking in this area has been challenged by intensive legislative activity
regulating conflicts between injured plaintiffs and insured defendants.
In Martinez v. Stefanich,2 2 a unanimous court, through Justice Erickson,
held that joint and several liability applies in a comparative negligence
setting. Erickson reaffirmed that policy in Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v.
Giford,2 3 which explored the issue in the context of multiple defendants.
Justice Erickson has also been active in the products liability field.
The Colorado Supreme Court has split on a number of difficult product
liability issues. For example, in Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Frazier,2 4 Justice
Erickson's four to three majority opinion held that a plaintiffs mishandling or misuse of a product can abrogate a duty to warn or instruct by
the manufacturer. The court split again in Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.,25
where the majority affirmed a substantial punitive damages award
against a manufacturer of contraceptives. In dissent, Justice Erickson
discussed the adverse policy ramifications of punitive damages in mass
tort litigation. He has consistently called for creative intervention by the
General Assembly in areas where the judiciary is unable to provide comprehensive reform.
CONCLUSION

In his diverse career, Justice Erickson has made a substantial contribution to the trial bar, the public, and Colorado jurisprudence. He is by
temperament a lawyer: devoted to the profession and energetic in his
approach to public and private duties. Justice Erickson's judicial philosophy draws on principles of balance and consensus; he demonstrates a
constant search for workable and principled standards. He draws from
his experience as a lawyer and an administrator, never losing sight of the
needs of both the practicing bar and the public for fair, economical, and
expeditious delivery of legal services.

21.

656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982).

22. 195 Colo. 341, 577 P.2d 1099 (1978).
23. 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983).
24. 642 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1982).
25. 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).

